Crowley v. Modern Faucet Mfg. Co. by Traynor, Roger J.
University of California, Hastings College of the Law
UC Hastings Scholarship Repository
Opinions The Honorable Roger J. Traynor Collection
4-19-1955
Crowley v. Modern Faucet Mfg. Co.
Roger J. Traynor
Follow this and additional works at: http://repository.uchastings.edu/traynor_opinions
This Opinion is brought to you for free and open access by the The Honorable Roger J. Traynor Collection at UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. It
has been accepted for inclusion in Opinions by an authorized administrator of UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. For more information, please
contact marcusc@uchastings.edu.
Recommended Citation
Roger J. Traynor, Crowley v. Modern Faucet Mfg. Co. 44 Cal.2d 321 (1955).
Available at: http://repository.uchastings.edu/traynor_opinions/368
Apr. 1955] CROWLEY tJ. MODERN FAUCET MFG. CO. 321 
[44 C.2d 321; 282 P.2d 33] 
[L. A. No. 23649. In Bank. Apr. 19, 1955.] 
L. E. CROWLEY, Appellant, v. MODERN FAUCET 
MANUFACTURING COMPANY (a Corporation) et aI., 
Respondents. 
[1] Judgments-Res Judicata-Judgment on Demurrer.-A judg-
ment entered after sustaining general demurrer is judgment 
on merits to extent that it adjudicates that facts alleged do not 
constitute cause of action, and will, accordingly, bar subse-
quent action alleging same facts. 
[2] Id.-Res Judicata-Judgment on Demurrer.-If general de-
murrer was sustained in first action on ground equally appli-
cable to second, former judgment on such demurrer will bar 
second action, though different facts are alleged in second 
action. 
[S] Id.-Res Judicata-Judgment on Demurrer.-If new or addi-
tional facts are alleged in second action which will cure 
defects in original pleading, former jUdgment on general de-
murrer is not bar to subsequent action, whether or not plaintiff 
had opportunity to amend his complaint. 
[4] Oontracts-Form as Element.-A written memorandum is not 
identical with written contract; it is merely evidence of it 
and usually does not contain all terms, and use of ward 
"memorandum" implies that it is something less than contr&et. 
[6] Judgments - Res Judicata - Judgment on Demurrer. - Judg-
ment on demurrer in action based on oral contract is complete 
bar to subsequent action alleging that parties "entered into 
an exclusive sales agreement," even if plaintiff had inserted 
word "written" before phrase "exclusive sales agreement," 
where only writing on which plaintiff can rely is writing that 
was before court in first action, plaintiff admits that written 
contract relied on in second action is same document that was 
attached to prior complamt as exhibit, and both actions arose 
out of same transaction, were for same breach of same con-
tract, and involved same facts. 
[6] Dismissal-Insufficiency of Pleadings.-It is not abuse of dis-
cretion to dismiss action on ground that it is sham and frivo-
lous where plaintiff was given leave to amend first amended 
complaint for express purpose of pleading written contract, 
[1] Conclusiveness of judgment on demurrer, notes, 13 A.L.R. 
1104 j 106 A.L.R. 437. See also Oal.Jur., Judgments, § 184; Am.Jur., 
Pleading, § 251 et seq. 
McK. Dig. References: [1-3,5] Judgments, § 352; [4] Contracts, 




322 Cao'WLEY tJ. MODERN FAUCET MFG. Co. [44 C.2d 
and where he declined to do so and sought to relitigate precise 
issue that was finally adjudicated against him in prior action. 
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Loa 
Angeles County. John J. Ford, Judge. Affirmed. 
Action for an injunction, an accounting, awl damagea. 
Judgment of dismissal affirmed. 
Nicolas Ferrara for Appellant. 
Myron J. Glauber for Respondents. 
TRAYNOR, J.-On August 3, 1951, plaintifl brought an 
action seeking damages for breach of an oral contract. He 
alleged in his third amended complaint "That on or about 
the 17th day of October 1950 the plaintiff and defendants 
entered into an oral agreement" whereby he was given 
the exclusive right to buy from defendants certain patented 
shower heads. He also alleged that "a written memorandum 
of said agreement, signed by the defendants, is set forth in 
a letter dated October 17, 1950, a copy of which is attached 
hereto as Exhibit 'A' and made a part hereof as though set 
forth herein in full." A demurrer to this complaint on the 
grounds that the written memorandum did not meet the re-
quirements of the Statute of Frauds (Civ. Code, § 1624; Code 
Civ. Proc., § 1973) was sustained without leave to amend 
pursuant to a stipulation that "if the demurrer be sustained, 
that it be sustained without leave to amend." Judgm~t was 
entered that plaintiff take nothing in the action and that 
defendant recover its costs. Plaintiff's appeal from the judg-
ment was dismissed. 
On November 12, 1953, plaintiff brought the present action 
seeking an injunction, an accounting, and damages. The 
complaint alleges that "On or about October 17, 1950, at 
Los Angeles County California, plaintiffs and defendants 
made and entered into an exclusive sales agreement, and on 
said date defendants made, signed and delivered to plaintiffs 
their written memorandum of said agreement, wherein and 
whereby defendants agreed that they will sell exclusively to 
plaintiffs, and plaintiffs agreed that they will purchase ex-
clusively from defendants. . . ." Defendants filed a motion 
to dismiss, and the record in the first action offered in support 
of the motion was received in evidence. The motion to dismiss 
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identical with that alleged in the first action, that the prior 
judgment is res judicata, and that the action is sham and 
frivolous. A judgment of dismissal followed, from which 
plaintiff appeals. 
[1] The applicable rules are set forth in Keidafz v. Albany, 
39 Ca1.2d 826, 828 [249 P.2d 264]: (1) A judgment entered 
after a general demurrer has been sustained "is a judgment 
on the merits to the extent that it adjudicates that the facts 
alleged do not constitute a cause of action, and will accord-
ingly, be a bar to a subsequent action alleging the same facts." 
[2] (2)" [E]ven though different facts may be alleged 
in the second action, if the demurrer was sustained in the 
first action on a ground equally applicable to the second, the 
former judgment will also be a bar." [3] (3) "If, on the 
other hand, new or additional facts are alleged that cure 
the defects in the original pleading, it is settled that the 
former judgment is not a bar to the subsequent action whether 
or not plaintiff had an opportunity to amend his complaint." 
A comparison of the records in the two actions reveals 
that the facts alleged in the present action are substantially 
the same as those adjudicated in the first action and that 
the case therefore falls squarely within the first rule in the 
Keidatz case. 
Plaintiff contends that the prior judgment is not res judicata 
on the ground that the first action was based on an oral 
contract, whereas the present action is for breach of a written 
contract. The language of his complaint does not bear out 
his contention, but even if it did the result would be the same. 
The ·prior complaint alleged an oral contract. The 
present complaint omits that allegation but does not expressly 
allege a written contract. It merely alleges that the parties 
"entered into an exclusive sales agreement" and that defend-
ants "si~'Ded (lnd delivered to plaintiffs a written memoran-
dum" thereof. The written document is referred to only as 
a memorandum, and only one party is alleged to have signed 
it. [4] A written memorandum is not identical with a 
written contract (see Rest., Contracts, § 207): it is merely 
evidence of it and usually does not contain all of the 
terms. (See 2 Witkin, California Procedure, 1228.) The 
very use of the word "memorandum" implies that it is 
something less than a contract, and it was apparently in 
that sense that the word was used in section 1624 of the 
Civil Code and section 1973 of the Code of Civil Procedure. 
Plaintiff simply alleges that the parties entertd into a sales 
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agreement and is noncommittal as to whether that agree-
ment is written or oral. 
[5] Even if plaintiff had inserted the word "written" be-
fore the phrase "exclusive sales agreement" be would llot 
have escaped the bar of res judicata. The only writing Oll 
whieh plaintiff can rely is the writing that was before the 
court in the first action. The motion to dismiss and the 
affidavit in support thereof, tendered the issue whether there 
were other writings between the parties, and there were no 
counteraffidavits. If there were other writings, plain-
tiff" should have produced them in opposition to the motion. 
He was bound to meet the issue tendered by the motion or 
abide the results of the heal·jng thereon." (Cunha v. Anglo-
California Nat. Bank, 34 Ca1.App.2d 383, 392 [93 P.2d 572].) 
Moreover, plaintiff admits that the written contract re-
lied on in the present action is the same document that was 
attached to the prior complamt as an exhibit. The court 
held in the first action that it was not even a memorandum 
of a contract, a fortiori it cannot be a written contract. It 
was relied on in the first action to comply with the statute 
of frauds and was relied on in the present action for the 
same purpose. Both actions arose out of the same trans-
action, both actions were for the same breach of the same 
contract, and both involve the same facts. The judgment 
in the first action is therefore a complete bar to the present 
action. (Keidatz v. Albany, supra, 39 Ca1.2d 826, 828 and 
cases cited therein.) 
[6] The trial court did not abuse its discretion in dis-
missing the action on the additional ground that it was sham 
and frivolous. Not only was it barred by the judgment in 
the first action, but in that action plaintiff was given leave 
to amend his first amended complaint for the express purpose 
of pleading a written contract. lIe deliberately declined to 
do so and stipulated that "if the demurrer be sustained that 
it be sustained without leave to amend." In the present 
action he sought to avoid the effect of the former adjudication 
by failing to disclose in his complaint that the document upon 
which he now relies was the same document that was before 
the trial court in the first action and there beld insufficient 
to comply with the statute of frauds. When it appeared 
without dispute in this action that plaintiff was in fact seek-
ing to relitigate the precise issue that was finally adjudicated 
against him in the former action, the trial court properly 
exercised its power to stop vexatious litigation, clearly with-
) 
out merit, and burdensom(l to the courts as well as to de-
fendants. (OunlLa v . .. 4.nglo-California Nat. Bank, s'upra, 34 
Cal.App.2d 383, 388-391; Neal v. Bank of America, 93 Cal. 
App.2d 678, 682 [209 P.2d 825] ; McKenna v. Elliott & Horns 
00., 118 Cal.App.2d 551, 555 [258 P.2d 528].) 
The judgment is affirmed. 
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., Edmonds, J., Carter, J'J Schauer 
J., and Spence, J'J concurred. 
